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PREFACE 
This paper is the second of an ISEG R series directed at
problems of justice in Alaska's isolated villages. It identifies and 
analyzes northern Eskimo attitudes toward conflict resolution and 
social order in an effort to determine where these cultural 
traditions and behavioral norms conflict or work in harmony with 
Western legal institutions. 
This effort is a direct outgrowth of the 1970 Bush Justice
Conference held at Alyeska under the sponsorship of the Alaska 
Judicial Council. The conference, a culmination of the 
long-standing concern of Alaska's legal community over the 
difficult problems of improving justice in rural areas, brought
together judges, attorneys, village council members, rural
magistrates, and others to determine what issues were involved and 
what actions should be taken. Some of the reform needs were 
readily indentifiable and could be undertaken by experienced legal 
personnel. These resulted in such developments as: the village 
constable training program (recently initiated by the State 
Department of Public Safety); a magistrate advisory committee to
suggest reforms in the magistrate's duties; improved education for
bush magistrates; new physical facilities for bush justice in Native 
villages; and continued expansion of the Alaska public defenders 
and Alaska legal services to rural areas. 
In other areas, however, the courses of action for reform
were not so readily discernible. One of these was administration of
justice in a cross-cultural context. In this particular area, Alyeska 
conference participants recommended that university researchers
should help clarify critical social problems and undertake studies
to provide greater understanding and information on cultural
attitudes toward law, social control, and dispute resolution. In this
  
 
 
 
 
paper, the authors set forth their perception of the situation and
provide analyses that may assist in further resolving the problems 
of bush justice.
In the next phase of their work, the authors in cooperation
with the State Supreme Court and Alaska Eskimo villagers have, 
under a National Science Foundation Grant, begun an innovative
experiment to develop alternative procedures for conflict 
management in Eskimo villages. If successful, these procedures 
could allow the incorporation of the socially beneficial activities 
of village councils into the legal system, as applicable to rural 
regions of the state. 
The authors and the institute express their special gratitude 
to the village people, the magistrates, and all others who have 
made this study possible. 
Victor Fischer
Director, ISEG R
July 1973 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the first paper of this series (Hippler and Conn, 1972), we
suggested the theoretical and behavioral bases of precontact social
control in Alaska Athabascan tribes. We also pointed out some 
disjunctions between the aboriginal theory and practice and those
of the contemporary American legal system. An extensive
literature concerning subarctic Athabascans has disputed the
presence of significant social control mechanisms or "law" for
northeastern Athabascans (Canadians). However, it is generally
agreed that northwestern Athabascans (Alaskans) had developed a
more sophisticated and complex social organization, as described
in our analysis of Athabascan law ways,1 so that it is indeed 
possible to discuss a structured Athabascan law system .2 
Although ethnographers and other early observers almost
universally agree that formal mechanisms of social control ( except 
for central Canada's drum dance) were absent in aboriginal Eskimo 
groups, 3 the situation for Eskimos is generally more complicated.
It is more complicated for two reasons. First, there are distinct 
differences between northern Alaska Eskimos, Eskimos of the
1 We are currently preparing an overview of this and other aspects of 
subarctic Athabascan life. The best present sources for such information are
McKennan (1969), Bowes (1964), Rich (1938), Honigmann (1963), and 
MacNeish (1956). 
2we define "formal law" to describe (1) a clearly discernible system of 
rights and wrongs, duties, and obligations with (2) the intent of universal 
application and a prescribed method of enforcement and (3) procedures for 
adjudication of disputes. 
3see Hoebel, 1941, 1954, 1963; Van den Steenhoven, 1959; Graburn, 
1968, 1969; and Spencer, 1959; though Pospisil, 1964, 1971, disagrees. 
Pospisil 's disagreement will be discussed. 
southwestern region (See Lantis, 1938, 1946, 1947, and 1959), 
and the Siberian Eskimos of St. Lawrence Island (see Hughes, 
1966). For this reason, we are limiting our present comments to 
northern Eskimos.4 Second, the absence of formal legal systems 
needs to be explained if we are to understand how northern 
Eskimo society survived. 
Briefly, we shall show that the absence of a formal system of 
social control, or "law," in aboriginal times flowed from other 
aspects of Eskimo personality and culture. Further, through subtly 
intervening authorities, forms of interaction did develop which, 
although never formalized, at least made group activity possible. 
The values underlying these interactions colored and still color 
Eskimo expectations both toward authority and toward other 
persons with whom conflict was possible. 
These basic values in Eskimo life, internalized as aspects of 
the personality, develop from the child's socialization experience. 
They govern expectations for adult interpersonal behavior and, in 
turn, lead to certain kinds of social organizations in aboriginal 
Eskimo communities. Despite many changes in Eskimo life in the 
last 80 years, including at least two significant changes in the 
structure of Eskimo legal processes, the personality bases of 
Eskimo behavior and hence expectations goyerning social 
interaction have remained relatively constant. 5 
This paper first describes the personality bases that 
contribute to Eskimo attitudes toward conflict and its resolution. 
It describes the effect of these attitudes on his aboriginal society 
(its norms and forms of redress) and his society's capacity to 
resolve conflicts on behalf of its members. The paper analyzes the 
influence of Anglo-American agents of change on that capacity 
and, especially, the legal system and procedures that developed in 
4see Hippler (1970) for an annotated bibliography of source materials 
concerning northern Eskimos. 
5Lubart (1971) in his work among Canadian Eskimos points out in some 
detail the great conservative tendencies he has observed in socialization 
practices. 
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the post-contact use of the village council to resolve disputes. 
Finally, it describes the formal intervention of state law through 
the magisterial system and its interaction with Eskimo law ways 
that the village council encouraged. 
Further, a comparison of the village councils and magistrate 
courts points out the apparent success of the councils because of 
their- unique fit with Eskimo values and expectations. Finally, 
shortcomings of .the current magistrate system are analyzed with 
suggestions for policy adaptations. 
Habitat of the North Alaska Eskimo 
Ethnographers have defined the north Alaska Eskimo to 
include two categories of Inupik speaking peoples. The first 
inhabited the Arctic Ocean, Chukchi Sea, and Bering Sea littorals 
from the Alaska-Canada border to Shaktolik in Norton Sound. 
Most of these groups were Tauremiut (sea mammal hunters). The 
second are the Nunamiut (caribou hunters) who lived further 
inland along the Kobuk, Noatak, and Colville rivers and in the 
mountains of the Brooks Range. All of these groups were hunters 
and gatherers and depended almost entirely on the proceeds of the 
chase for their existence. 6 
Because of the greater number of available prey species along 
the seacoast than in the interior, Eskimos along the littoral could 
6This distinction of Tauremiut and Nunamiut, though widely used in 
the literature on Eskimos, is nonetheless somewhat arbitrary. Inland people 
did occasionally come to the coastal regions to hunt sea mammals. In fact, as 
Spencer (1959), Milan (1964), Rodahl (1963), and others have noted, some, 
if not most, of the present inhabitants of the north coast of Alaska are 
descendants of Nunamiut who moved to the coast after the disease-induced 
dissemination of the Tauremiut following white contact. In the past, 
Tauremiut also traveled inland in search of caribou. 
3 
live in large communities, perhaps as many as 200 or 300 
inhabitants.7 
Given the size of these communities, some effective form of 
social organization had to operate. This was essential not only to 
permit such groups to form but to hold them together and to 
provide the basis for the communal hunting of large land and sea 
mammals. 
Social Structure and Organization 
Northern Eskimo communities had very little formal social 
organization beyond kin groupings. No chieftains, no councils as 
such, and no established intervening judicial authorities apparently 
existed. Recognition of this is essential and critical to 
understanding aboriginal Eskimo attitudes toward interpersonal 
conflict. The basis of what social organization existed was the 
nuclear family, extended through bilateral kinship8 and fictive 
kinship ties to an ever-widening range of people. As Heinrich 
(1955, 1960) noted, each individual was surrounded by a close 
network of kinfolk with whom he had clearly defined and 
unavoidable relationships. Outside of this narrow range, the 
Eskimo had a circle of known relatives of some distance with 
whom he could arbitrarily select desired relationships. Beyond 
that was the "other" group which included everyone else. But 
even with this "other" group, one could establish fictive kinship 
ties through wife exchange and other mechanisms. 
A bilateral kinship system such as the northern Eskimos had 
does not prescribe relationships so severely as a unilateral one. 
7Early literature is unclear on these sizes. Much larger and much smaller 
figures have been suggested (Murdoch, 1892; Beechey, 1831; and Nelson, 
1899). Our designations of group size are compromise figures. 
8mtateral kinship is the kind presently used in the United States in
which relatives are counted on both the mother's and father's sides. 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instead of creating many ties with many people (yvhich can and
may assist in the development of corporate structures), the
Eskimo response to their kinship organization tended to result in a
series of mutually exclusive relationships consisting of an 
individual and his nuclear family, and ultimately of the individual
alone. In effect, though he was related to nearly everyone nearby, 
he could and often did act as though he were related to no one, 
and in fact tended to stand entirely alone. This lack of close ties
was not, however, solely a function of the kinship system per se 
but also of basic Eskimo attitudes. The Eskimo personality
predisposed the individual toward diffuseness of ties.
Eskimo attitudes toward other persons created a social milieu 
in which generally the nature of one's person-to-person
relationship rather than prescribed behavior determined one's
interaction with others.9 Nor would he interfere with otb.ers. No 
one had overall control in Eskimo society. There were no 
permanently designated leaders.
Given the absence of a formal system for social control and a
very limited social structure, we believe that the explanation for 
the northern Eskimo's ability to maintain large social groups lies in 
Eskimo personality organization. 
9Graburn (1969) makes this point for Canadian Eskimos as well.
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10Personality  
We believe that the absence of Eskimo law is largely a
function of the personality system and value structure of Eskimo
culture.11
Eskimo cultural personality may be described essentially as
"oral optimistic fatalism."12 That is, an early nurturant child
rearing predisposes the child to optimistically view the universe as
fundamentally giving and benign. This original personality core is 
lOwe have extrapolated personality characteristics of northern Eskimos
from observed behavior, the ethnographic record, and contemporary 
psychiatric evaluations as well as test results of projective tests we have
given-principally H.A. Murray's Apperception Test. While such analyses
reflect the dynamics present in contemporary Eskimo society, we have also
inferred from them in reconstructing aboriginal personality characteristics. 
Two recent symposiums of the American Psychoanalytic Association on 
cross-cultural use of psychoanalytic theory in anthropological field work
(December, 1971 and December, 1972) show general consensus on the 
formulations we are using by a number of observers of Eskimos.
111t is probably true that ultimately ecological relationships are 
important determinants of personality and possibly social structure. However, 
they are out of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we note that it is not a 
priori necessary that isolated hunting and gathering groups have no formal
social org.:inization or law ways. Athabascan Indians in perhaps even more 
extreme circumstances did develop formal legal systems (Hippler and Conn,
1972). These systems, and other aspects of Athabascan culture, appear to
reflect Athabascan personality dimensions (Hippler, 1973; Hippler, Boyer and
Boyer, 1973). 
12we are aware of Wallace's strictures (1952) concerning the use of 
modal personality. It is true that all cultures contain multi-modal personality 
types. We have nonetheless found the modal personality approach useful both 
as a descriptive and theoretical device for such studies as this. The behavioral
pressure of a cultural system in a relatively homogeneous group tends to mold
even divergent personality types toward similar behaviors. It is not difficult to
point out "group" personalities (DeVos and Hippler, 1969). Thus by
"cultural personality" we mean that integrated whole of unconscious 
concerns, interests, defenses, and coping mechanisms which characterize the
members of a group. It is a behavioral organization scheme which acts as a 
centripetal force on individual psychodynamic divergence.
6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
altered by other aspects of socialization which create a feeling in 
the child that in spite of its essential benevolence, the universe and 
most especially the people in it are unpredictable at times. The 
child learns defenses which cause him to shrug off or ignore the 
rage he feels at unpredictable intrusions into his own autonomy,
or he learns to overtly deny, with a smile, that anything is wrong 
at all, since he cannot control the universe. This "fatalism"
parallels certain "fatalistic" aspects of the mythology as well
(Jenness, 1924).
With such a personality structure, the individual Eskimo was 
generally confident about his ability to handle the physical
universe, though he was far less secure in the world of persons.
When frustrated by someone else, he either ignored the frustrating 
agent (denial), attacked it (rage), helplessly accepted it (passivity),
or fled (retreat); he had no adjudicative alternatives. His preferred
modes were to ignore the source of frustration or to flee. These 
actions reflect the psychic defenses of denial and retreat which are
the core of Eskimo responses to interpersonal conflict. We believe
that child socialization practices were the actual genesis of the
psychic defenses and hence attitudes underlying the behavior. 
Eskimo socialization was quite distinct. 
Childhood Socialization 
Many authors have commented on the extreme leniency of 
Eskimo child rearing (Pettit, 1956; Simpson, 1875; Chance, 1966;
Heinrich, 1955; Fejes, 1966; Gubser, 1965; M. Spencer, 1954; and
Parker, 1962).13 Throughout childhood, Eskimo children charac­
teristically had full access to their immediate environment and
their exploratory urges were rarely stifled. Just as important, 
however, to the development of the child's personality was the
13other sources which we have used for ethnographic reconstruction 
include Jenness (1924) concerning mythology, Wilson (1958) concerning 
taboos and socialization, Boas (1899) concerning property rights, Garber 
(1935) concerning sex and marriage, Hrdlicka (1936) on fertility and infant
mortality, Jenness (1953) on numerous issues, and Rasmussen (1952) on 
various aspects of supernatural belief. 
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close skin-to-skin contact of mother and child which was nearly
continuous from birth to about one year of age. The security and 
warmth in mother's parka hood and access to the breast whenever 
it desired optimized the child's sense of psychic security and 
well-being. This prolonged, intense closeness combined with a 
permissive noncensorious parental attitude led to the development 
of a secure, optimistic, and confident individual who was fully
capable of using the executive capacities of his ego and who had a 
strong sense of self-worth. However, this very closeness developed 
expectations which were dramatically frustrated by other aspects
of socialization. These frustrated expectations then acted to 
produce certain potentially disadvantageous attitudes in the 
individual. 
During the crucial period of life around 7 to 10 months when 
most children are beginning to differentiate between self and
other, the Eskimo child's self-other differentiation was made more
difficult by his intense, protracted (but otherwise benevolent) 
closeness to the mother. Most children develop a sense of 
depression at this period in their lives, at least temporarily, 
through their anxious recognition that mother and the self are not 
one, and that at times what the infant perceives as the "good 
mother" (present and nurturant) can give way to the perceived 
"bad mother" (absent and non-nurturant). This is not a 
pathological but a normal human emotional development (Freud,
1923; Klein, 1932). Properly resolved, it sets the basis for the
adult's ability to consider other human beings as autonomous 
agents whose existences are separate from his own. 
Failure to make this distinction adequately can lead the 
individual to a lifelong feeling of mystical connection with all 
things-the so-called "oceanic" experience. However, since the 
individual identifies himself as the center of and coterminous with 
the universe, he tends to be somewhat egocentric and naturally 
disinterested in others as autonomous agents except insofar as
their actions affect him. 
In reality, this extreme case could not be and was not true of 
all Eskimos at all times. Nevertheless, it was a pervasive tendency
which did color interpersonal relations in Eskimo society. 
8
This potentially egocentric organization is reflected in the 
mythology in which all things are seen somehow as part of each 
other in a mystical sense (Rasmussen, 1952; Lucier, 1954, 1958). 
But this very global attitude, though stemming from an egocentric 
notion, was modified and acted as a positive social means of 
correcting selfishness since it assumed all things, human and 
animal, natural and supernatural are interconnected and one 
disturbed them at one's peril. 
Although the notion that one is the center of the universe, 
incorporating all else, human and nonhuman, sometimes led the 
individual to purely instrumental relationships with others, he 
unconsciously rationalized these relationships to bring them into 
harmony with both society and his ego. That is, the individual 
tended to assume that when the self acted in accordance with 
egocentric attitudes, it was really expressing a socially positive 
value rather than a selfish one, since unconsciously the self and 
others were believed to be coterminous. However, a conscious 
recognition that they were not coterminous, in conjunction with 
egocentric notions, led the Eskimo to avoid intruding on others 
for fear of eliciting rage in them by disturbing their own 
egocentric universes. As we shall note below, it was not only this 
oceanic emotional organization whose disturbance could lead to 
rage which then had to be socialized against. Part of the actual 
socialization tactics of Eskimo child rearing was an inconsistent 
form of teasing. The rages elicited by this teasing and the learned 
suppression of those rages were crucial for development of Eskimo 
patterns of avoidance and suppression which became evident in 
later life. This set of attitudes was positively supported culturally 
by the Eskimo norm of noninterference in other's lives. 
Cooperation and Sharing 
Eskimo society, supported by its mythical and religious 
systems, positively sanctioned such pragmatic and realistic values 
as cooperation and sharing with others. In addition to serving such 
reality functions as communal hunting and food sharing, 
cooperation and sharing were supported unconsciously by the 
identification which one felt with all others and paradoxically by 
9 
the purely instrumental feelings one had toward others in gaining 
one's own ends. 
These basic attitudes were modified as they must be by the 
vicissitudes in individual emotional development sequences (which 
we shall not attempt to detail here), reality concerns, and other 
aspects of personal maturation. The sum total of these experiences 
not only contributed to the development of a strong personal 
security system and confidence in dealing with the physical 
universe but also added to the tendency to cope with interpersonal 
frustration by avoidance or explosive violence.14 The avoidance 
tendency, a form of defensive denial, is evidenced by the 
legendary good humor of the Eskimos, which, as Heinrich (1955) 
notes, creatively hid the great aggressiveness and repressed desires 
that easily exploded into violence under the influence of 
alcoho1.15 
Other Socialization Patterns-Sanctions Against Violence 
Since a society made up of totally ego-centered individuals 
could not function, Eskimos had to develop other socialization 
patterns to create the cooperative kind of Eskimo society that 
existed and whose values were reflected in the mythology. Though 
Eskimo child rearing is and was generally lenient, it has developed 
strong _prohibitive sanctions. The strongest are sanctions against 
interpersonal violence_ 16 Eskimos did and still do assume that the 
child has no reasoning power to begin with and hence is at the 
14we are preparing a fuller discussion of Eskimo culture and personality 
for publication at a later date. The above remarks should be seen as a brief 
skeleton, adequate for a discussion of law ways, but by no means a thorough 
analysis of Eskimo personality. 
15Preston (1964), in analyzing Rorschach results of northern Eskimos, 
notes the high level of form dominance, usually associated with emotional 
inadequacy or inaccessibility and which we interpret as control over affect. 
l6 Although many other Eskimo socialization practices are important, 
emphasis on nonviolence is crucial for the purposes of our paper, and we will 
deal with others only in passing. 
10 
mercy of his instinctual drives. Every effort was bent to build his 
potential for reasoning power, however, and in the process he was 
taught nonviolence toward others and respect for parental 
authority. This was done indirectly by example, since an 
individual did not interfere actively with a child anymore than he 
would with an adult.17 For example, one adult might say to 
another within the hearing of a misbehaving child that "one 
believes that a good person wouldn't break furniture." 
The sophisticated unconscious recognition that Eskimos had 
concerning their enculturated difficulty to deal with aggression in 
othe:..., caused them to stress nonaggressive attitudes in child 
rearing, because they recognized the need to obviate the anger that 
so easily flows from infringements on the global egocentric 
personality and its touchiness about outside interference which 
was created by the early childhood patterns. 
Elicitation of Rage and its Control 
The Eskimo adult's sense of the unpredictability of the 
human universe (whose genesis we discuss below) and great 
caution in interpersonal relations contrasted sharply with the 
security with which Eskimos dealt with the physical environment. 
In part, as we have suggested, this stemmed from the 
self-contained view which Eskimos derived from the early 
satisfying child socialization which, however, also made it difficult 
for him to withstand frustration since his every early wish was 
satisfied and later ones were inconsistently dealt with. The rage he 
felt at frustration he came to recognize in others and thus tried to 
avoid eliciting these feelings in others by circumspect behavior. 
This sense of caution in dealing with others, we believe, was also 
enhanced by the subtle manipulation of the child's mood by the 
mother (Freeman, Foulks, and Freeman, 1972). That is, Eskimo 
mothers tend not to like fussy infants. When an infant starts to cry 
the mother will either use the breast to pacify him or, by 
17Briggs (1970a, 1970b) also found these characteristics present in 
central Canadian Eskimo child rearing. 
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stiffening her body or by some other nonverbal signal, let the child 
know she is displeased with his behavior. Generally, the latter
precedes the former. This is of crucial importance. The infant,
because of its immature emotional and intellectual state, interprets 
anger from the mother as a threat to withdraw nurturance.
The infant comes, therefore, to respond to subtle maternal
cues for its behavior, and finally comes to generalize the idea that 
all of its behavior is determined by subtle expressions of
approbation or disapprobation which come from objects outside 
the self. Thus, on the one hand the child is overtly signalled that it 
may do anything it pleases. Covertly, however, it is told that it 
must conform continually to others. This entire process was
furthered by both sporadic teasing after about two years of age by 
adults, and by an intense jealousy on the part of older brothers 
and sisters. 
At times, the child would be teased by adults for its desire
for the breast. Such teasing, probably motivated by unconscious 
jealousy, was initiated precipitously and carried out and concluded
in what must have appeared to the infant an arbitrary and
inexplicable manner, as the ordinarily pleasant and supportive
adults around him would suddenly become unpleasant and
nonsupportive. Of course, the mother or other adults involved 
would not see such teasing as cruel. The child soon learned that his 
crying and complaining about such teasing availed him little and 
indeed increased his tormentor's activity. He then learned to 
withdraw· internally in the face of teasing and become more stoic 
when faced with these unassailable aggressors. Throughout the
teasing, the child learned that his actions were and must be limited 
by his fear of the loss of the maternal introject (that aspect of the
mother which the child comes to internalize as part of himself)
and that other peoples' attitudes, inexplicable or not, limited his 
autonomy. This created a repressed rage at the intrusion upon his 
own autonomy.
Displacement of Aggression 
In later years, when the child himself is displaced by a new
infant, his normal jealous and aggressive attitudes toward the
12 
infant are kept in check by the strong socialization against 
aggression so that he learned again to avoid the conflicts he felt. 
Part of this powerful sanction against interpersonal aggression 
consists of adult strictures to the child to simply suppress 
aggressive feelings. Since suppression is rarely adequate, the child 
learns to displace aggression onto animals, especially dogs, birds, 
and mice. As an adult he learns to utilize his aggression in the 
pursuit of game, which is clearly of overwhelming social utility. 
Briggs (1970a, 1970b) has also observed similar behavior among 
the central Canadian Eskimos. 
Displacing aggression, then, is how Eskimos creatively dealt 
with strong aggressive urges. That is, the child learns to suppress 
interpersonal aggression and to redirect it into acceptable channels 
as a child and socially useful ones as an adult. At times, however, 
for certain individuals these controls over aggression were not 
completely adequate. This occurred when a local "bully" was 
produced who provided special problems for the community 
which we shall discuss below. 
This kind of personality structure embedded in the cultural 
value system of Eskimos created two behavior characteristics of 
significance for social control: 
• Individuals tended to do what they wanted to the 
extent they could without eliciting violent retaliation 
from others. 
• Individuals also learned to avoid relationships where 
they might be drawn into conflict, unless they could be 
certain victors in such a conflict. 
Since the first characteristic predisposed people toward 
egocentric actions and the second tended to reduce the possibility 
for communal activity, which was nonetheless necessary, conflict 
inevitably resulted. 
Further, the social climate was adverse to the development of 
intervening legal authorities, since people strove to avoid being 
13 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
placed in roles where they had to interfere overtly in other's lives
or have others interfere in their lives. 
The next section describes the actual operation of these
attitudes in Eskimo aboriginal society as it dealt with conflict-the 
manner in which Eskimos creatively integrated these conflicting 
attitudes into workable societal arrangements.
THE GENESIS OF ESKIMO LAW WAYS IN 
18 ABORIGINAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In view of Eskimo attitudes toward conflict resolution from
aboriginal times to the present day, it is useful to locate them
within the context of a universal definition of legal systems that
has been devised by Leopold Pospisil, an authority in law and 
anthropology (1964, 1971, 1972).
Pospisil suggests that legal systems within any society have 
the following components: 
• Authorities existing within groups or subgroups of the 
society. (There may be either multiple interdependent 
levels of law within a society or multiple independent 
legal systems within any society.) 
l81nformation concerning Eskimo law ways was derived from analysis 
of ethnographic information including such authors as R. Spencer (1959); 
Boas (1899); Garber (1935); Chance (1966); Murdoch (1892); and others.
Such information was added to informants' statements collected from
individuals from 13 northern Eskimo communities and specific community
information from the two largest northern Alaska Eskimo villages. 
Information concerning post-contact law ways and present day law ways was 
collected from informants from five northern Alaska Eskimo villages, written 
documents from two villages, U.S. commissioners' statements, and statements 
from judicial and law enforcement personnel who had served in this area, as 
well as from individual comments from anthropologists who have worked in
this area (Fred Milan and Edwin Hall). The analysis of this information is, 
however, our own responsibility.
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Intention of these authorities to shape the prospective 
behavior of members of these subgroups through the 
universal application of norms articulated in the 
resolution of disputes within the subgroups. 
• Creation through the resolution of disputes of obligatios 
(or that part of a legal decision that defines the rights of 
the entitled and the duties of the obligated parties).19 
• Imposition of sanctions by the authorities on 
wrongdoers in their subgroups. 
Pospisil 's universal definition of law and the legal systems 
which generate it in traditional societies can be fruitfully applied 
to Eskimo society. In this application, the implications of
aboriginal Eskimo attitudes to conflict through an interpersonal
system of conflict avoidance are clarified.
Central to his definition of legal process is the accepted role
for judicial authorities in any society. In aboriginal Eskimo society
judicial authorities were not accepted because such authorities
needed to isolate and recognize conflict situations in order to
address them.
Pospisil recognizes that legal systems are not always
autonomous. Nor, he concludes, must law emanate from a single 
central authority. A legal system is an attribute of a political 
structure of a society that can be described as a "configuration of
analytically derived relationships of those purposive activities of 
individuals and groups of individuals which establish or maintain
authority and determine its . . . judicial functions" (italics
added).20
This implies that a society defines the role and functions of
acceptable authority for resolving conflicts.
19Pospisil, 1972, p. 22. 
20Pospisil, 1959, p. 1. 
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The esteemed individual in Eshimo society was not the law 
giver and conflict resolver but rather the conflict avoider who did
not judge the behavior of others. 
Absent from northern Eskimo social dynamics was a desire
to have third parties intervene overtly and settle conflicts.
However, esteemed individuals were looked upon to use their 
power to blunt those attributes of necessary activities from which 
disputes might be generated. Eskimos held in esteem the man who 
was skilled in manipulating social relationships involving
subsistence activities. For example, the managerial skill of the 
umealih and power derived from his ownership of property
allowed him to articulate and apply rules of the hunt and provide 
a structural basis for specific communal activity.
The individual who offered his strength as an ally to another
individual to stabilize a potential situation of imbalance between
persons also provided some stability to potentially unstable social
situations. These alliances were formulated not at the behest of 
group or social interests, but as a result of trade-offs or deals 
between individual Eskimos.
Not esteemed or tolerated was the intervening aggressor, who
brought latent conflict to the surface or who intervened in 
situations where tenuous relationships had slipped over the edge 
into aggression and counter-aggression. Only those asocial persons 
who were entirely disinterested in shaping group behavior through
universal articulation of norms or reintegration of disputants
assumed the role of overt confrontationist in aboriginal Eskimo
society. These individuals were not leaders or group authorities.
They were the bullies. The bully could with impunity sweep aside
the often tenuous coverings of potentially hostile relationships. 
The effect of his actions was to muddy the waters of community 
life and set into motion the responses and counter-responses that 
lead to flight or individual or group violence. 
In short, it is the style of authority figures in northern 
Eskimo society that represents the point of divergence from a 
sound universal model for legal systems. Bringing things to a head
16 
or laying one's cards on the table, which are the virtues of 
adversarial relationships and the Western structure of conflict 
resolution, was not the form of conflict resolution acceptable to 
Eskimo society. Eskimos did not seek out leaders who were 
interventionists; neither did leaders seek to intervene. Eskimos did 
respect members of their society who would successfully create 
frl).mes of reference for amelioration of conflict-breeding 
situations. 
The Bases of Eskimo Law in Aboriginal 
Norms and Sanctions 
Although there were no Eskimo lawgivers or judges in 
aboriginal times, the social norms and sanctions, as well as 
compacts between offenders and offended individuals or groups 
remained discernible after the style of Eskimo justice changed and 
can still be inferred for aboriginal times. 
Norms: Simply stated, most Eskimo behavioral norms derived 
from an attitude that predisposed the Eskimo to believe that one 
should never interfere in the life of another. This attitude 
stemmed from a strong feeling of individuality and the fear that 
interfering with someone else's individuality would lead to 
retaliatory violence. Flowing from this all-encompassing attitude 
were such normative beliefs as: one should not kill, steal, commit 
adultery, tell lies, or in any way intervene in another's life. 
Running counter to these beliefs, however, was the implicit 
statement: 21 one should not do these things unless he can get away with it. One could in fact "get away with it," if one were 
stronger than others. These attitudes did not predispose Eskimos 
toward forma._l legal systems. 
21 Supported by all our informants. We believe this modification of 
normative beliefs is consistent with other aspects of Eskimo personality. 
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Yet, a basic behavioral norm existed that seemed 
contradictory to the Eskimo's self-centeredness. Men were
expected to share and cooperate with each other. A level of social 
altruism or at least enlightened self-interest seemed to coexist with
the self-centeredness we have described. Eskimos were capable of 
sharing and cooperation despite this basic self-centeredness
because, despite certain pathological attitudes, they were capable 
of reality testing in these areas and could consciously suppress
conflict as well as repress it. 
These apparently conflicting norrris and attitudes, however, 
meant that only those individuals gifted at subtle techniques of 
interpersonal manipulation could organize group activities in 
Eskimo society. This had to be done in a manner that concealed 
one's authority and avoided conflict, as we shall discuss below. 
Sanctions and Redress: Sanctions in Eskimo society were very
limited since they were based on the noncoercive and 
conflict-avoiding value system and personality. The net effect was
that a wide range of wrongs were ignored. Victims had no pacific 
means of redress. They feared retaliation against themselves if they
tried violent redress. Like the child who withdrew in the face of 
teasing, the adult withdrew in the face of adversity. If the 
emotional _pressure of simply accepting or ignoring abuse became 
too great, the individual could flee or kill his tormentor. Killing
was common, 22 and since it set into motion vengeance by sons, 
feuds were interminable.23 
Redress was therefore either mild to the point of 
nonexistence or it was extreme. It was rarely what could be 
termed a "legal redress," and sanctions therefore contributed little 
to remaking the balance between offender and offended. It is true
that village gossip and social ostracism were sanctions used against
22see Freuchen (1961) for a description of similar events among eastern
Eskimos.
23rnformants note this, though from the ethnographic record this was
more common among Eskimos to the east of the Alaskan groups.
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wrongdoers. But unless the offender were socially responsive 
enough to care what others thought, such sanctions meant little. 
That is, they only worked on those who wanted them to work_24 
These nonphysical social sanctions such as gossip and 
ostracism were ordinarily limited as corrective measures (Eskimos 
avoid using the term "punishment") because of their diffuseness. 
No single person or group had the inclination or authority to 
direct the offender to remtmerate the victim or to reform his 
conduct in specific ways. Thus, because the only punishment that 
generally existed was indirect and psychological, its "message" to 
the offender and to the victim was weak and unclear. Such 
psychological punishment as gossip and ostracism certainly may 
have provided sufficient correction for a wi-ongdoer who was 
concerned about the potentially violent repercussions of his act. 
However, it was not strong or effective enough to change the 
conduct of an offender who was intentionally or unintentionally 
asocial, that is, who did not attempt to pattern his behavior so as 
to avoid conflict. Additional societal punishments simply did not , 
exist, partly because no perceived legitimate authority existed to 
impose punishments. 
Failure to Develop Judicial Authorities 
We believe that the northern Eskimos' reluctance to create 
intervening judicial authorities for dispute resolution and social 
control relates directly to the Eskimo personality and social 
structure. Eskimos vested critical importance in the individual and 
not in the lineage or the extended family as did the Athabascans. 
The aboriginal Eskimo's secure competence in dealing with 
the physical world and his paradoxically fatalistic optimism about 
it coexisted with his cautious view of intei-personal relationships. 
Thus, while he viewed himself as more or less coterminous with 
24This limited range of sanctions and the heavy reliance on murder as a 
sanction is also very clearly described by Graburn (1968, 1969) for eastern 
Eskimos in Canada. 
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the universe, he developed patterns of avoidance, deference, 
indirection, and circumlocution in a careful attempt to prevent 
this expansiveness from clashing with identical expansive feelings 
in his neighbors. Any attempt to create corporate or hierarchical 
structures with real authority over others would fail in the face of 
these attitudes. As we shall note, it was the advent of unassailable
outside authority which finally did create real authority
structures (for example, the village councils) to intervene in 
conflict situations. 
The. Eskimo approach to conflict resolution was essentially 
devoid of legitimate judicial authority. Its norms were based on 
avoidance and noninterference and its sanctions were either
nonexistent or extreme. Where social gossip failed to punish the 
offender, the offended party took the responsibility for redress.
As we have noted above, options open to the offended party were 
to deny that he was wronged, retreat, or murder the offender. 
Nonetheless, a type of regulated behavior did exist in Eskimo
society as it does for all human communities. In the Eskimo
society, however, in the absence of abstract religious,25 concrete
political, or judicial authorities, a pragmatic understanding of the 
results of one's actions determined one's behavior. 
Pragmatism in Normative Behavior 
The Eskimo's tendency to "do right" and not sanction
wrongdoing did not come from an abstract moral code nor from a
concern with formal legitimate external authorities. It was
essentially based on an assumption of lex talionis {law of 
retaliation) supported by cosmological beliefs and a vast series of 
taboos. Supernatural beliefs of Eskimos stressed the wholeness and 
interrelatedness of all things. The living and the dead, the animate
and the inanimate were not mutually exclusive categories. Wrong 
25shamanistic intervention also carried with it the weight of pragmatic 
power; it was not, strictly speaking, religious. Natural-supernatural
distinctions were less defined in Eskimo culture than in many others.
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acts and their punishments were connected magically as well as 
pragmatically. That is, wrongdoing magically created its own
punishments (for example, taboo-breaking could cause one to lose
hunting powers). This belief in a supernatural system of justice 
bears a striking resemblance to the kind of thinking prevalent in 
that stage in the child's emotional and cognitive developrnent
wherein he assumes that the table he hit has hurt his hand in talion
punishment (immanent justice). So also did Eskimo religious
beliefs assume that the universe would retaliate for
taboo-breaking. The child's normal belief in this type of immanent
justice was reinforced in adult life by an Eskimo's cultural belief in 
supernatural intervention through the shaman. This adult belief
was modified pragmatically by a potential wrongdoer's realistic
assessment of the personal damage he would incur either from the
angatqoq (shaman) or from the would-be victims or their relatives.
The angatqoq, supposedly in touch with the powers of the
universe, would discover a wrongdoer's evil act by magic and 
might choose to punish him by magic unless he were dissuaded by 
gifts. Beyond this, unless the wrongdoer were physically more
powerful than his victim, he also had to fear physical punishment 
from the victim.
Just as the wrongdoer had to deal constantly with the
potential danger of his antisocial acts, the victim, also in absence 
of any true judicial authorities to which he might turn for redress, 
had to fear physical retaliation for any overt response he might 
make to redress his own injury.
One way wronged Eskimos avoided the potential violence 
which could arise in dealing with the wrongdoer was to label the
act as something other than a crime. For example, while Eskimos 
appeared to use each other's goods with impunity, they did 
recognize theft as offensive and were often upset by someone who 
would "borrow" something without asking and then fail to return 
it. To avoid the conflicts that could occur over such incidents, 
these acts of theft were overtly defined as "borrowing." Even wife
theft could be converted into "vvife lending" if the offended 
husband chose not to voice a complaint or pursue the matter
aggressively. 
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Besides this overt nonrecognition of theft, the high social
value the Eskimos placed on sharing also functioned as a defense 
mechanism in dealing with wrongful acts. Many men (no doubt 
having fully internalized this defensive manuever so that they no 
longer saw it as a defense mechanism) made an effort to share all
they had. Not only were such attitudes placatory, their existence 
neutralized many potential problems and sometimes even made 
certain acts appear virtuous that would otherwise have been seen 
as reprehensible. Sharing goods also had a clear survival value, and 
the sharer gained prestige by his sharing. On the other hand, 
people remembered those who took advantage of such social 
amenities and lost respect for them.
These basic Eskimo values concerning avoidance of conflict, 
then, acted as a social glue. They held persons together in social 
units whose contradictory values would not have otherwise 
allowed social coexistence. 
Since no northern Eskimo authorities responded to wrongs
done to individuals simply because they were members of a group, 
a man's security depended on his neighbor's unwillingness to 
interfere in his life. His individual ability to tie himself to stronger
men by bonds of personal fealty enhanced his own ability to avoid 
aggression by bullies. Along with avoiding relationships that might 
result in conflict, the best way for an Eskimo to protect his life 
and property was to selectively create reciprocal obligations with 
stronger men in his own or other bands or villages. Many men 
exchanged wives or goods since these exchanges obligated the 
receiver and thereby offered a certain degree of r,rotection against 
violence from him. However, such offerings did not always
work.26 
One implication of the nearly absent Eskimo law ways in 
combination with the Eskimo's personality and vague social ties 
was that unchecked violence was quite prevalent in traditional
northern Eskimo society. Another implication was that there were 
261n some instances among eastern Eskimos as well as Alaska Eskimos, 
certain men simply killed others for their wives (Freuchen, 1961).
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complex fragile webs of relationships between individuals-
sometimes extending between villages and over hundreds of miles. 
An individual might have a positive trading relationship with
a man who was the mortal enemy of another friend without
having one of these relationships necessarily disrupt the other. All 
relationships were strictly on the personal, individual level. In fact,
men from one community could be at war with men from another
community while others of the two communities peacefully
traded. At the same time, some residents of either community 
might be feuding with others in their own community _27
What emerged, then, was a community life marred by
sporadic and endemic violence sometimes rising to the level of war 
or at other times subsiding to a drawn-out feud. To the degree that 
it existed at all, social control rested on fear of supernatural or
human retaliation. The man who felt unchallenged by such
controls was essentially a free agent. 
Social Control and Cooperative Activity 
The Bully: The apparent anarchic condition of Eskimo life was
ameliorated by individuals who exerted skillful influence within
groups. On the other hand it was exacerbated by a few rare
unsocialized and apparently unsocializable individuals who tended 
to bully others.
As noted, Eskimos tended to oppose anyone who attempted 
to be an interfering authority. At the same time, Eskimos refused 
to interfere in another's life. If they did accept another's
leadership voluntarily it was only for limited purposes such as
subsistence hunting or fishing. In other cases, they might accept
someone's control unwillingly because of coercion or bribery. The
apparent paradox of the "village bully" in a society of 
conflict-avoiding Eskimos is more tenable if we realize that bullies27 Ernest Burch is currently documenting just such cases for the northwest region of Alaska (private communication). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
exist in all societies. Furthermore, Eskimo socialization patterns 
tended to reinforce these bully-like attitudes in some persons. For
instance, because the bully's neighbors tried to avoid conflict and 
because there existed no structural mechanisms for control, the 
bully quite often got his way. Nonetheless, bullies were rare 
enough to be considered aberrations within traditional northern 
Eskimo society. Bullying was an unacceptable social role. Eskimos 
tolerated a bully out of fear until he antagonized enough men to 
create a potent body of adversaries. 
Quite often a group of outraged victims killed an impossible 
bully or a very dangerous angatqoq-often the same person. (Atangarok, the shaman from Point Hope, is an excellent example 
[Spencer, 1959] .) Such acts did not imply centralized executive 
and judicial considerations of innocence or guilt. Rather, group 
violence against a person who had become intolerable was the sum 
of individual feelings when no individual maneuver or alliance 
could satisfactorily avoid his antisocial conduct. Before a group of 
Eskimos took such action, the violent acts of an individual (be it 
murder, wife stealing, or theft) would have covered a range wide
enough to affect nearly all members of the group. The most
common victims of this group violence were, notably, multiple 
recidivist murderers28 
The Umealik: Although the umealik also had the ability to get 
others to do his will, he should not be confused with the bully. 
The umealik was the rich man in northern Eskimo society-a 
boat owner or hunt organizer. He usually held his position by
virtue of his wealth and general competence.29 But, despite his 
recognized economic position, the umealik was not an authority 
figure of aboriginal law ways. All informants, with no exception, 
have stressed that the umealik 's power to lead men and to manage 
work relationships ended when he stepped from the boat onto the
shore. While the umealik was in charge of the division of a whale 
taken by his crew, he did so according to well-known and agreed
28Freuchen (1961) makes this point clearly for eastern Eskimos as well. 
29For example, the north coast umealik provided the whale boat
provisions and necessary gear for sea mammal hunting. 
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upon procedures. He would not act arbitrarily or with undue 
assertiveness for fear of losing his crew and thus his position-the 
basis for his prestige. 
The umealik 's crew, many of whom were his relatives since 
fealty could more easily be expected from relatives, usually had to 
be cajoled (especially if they were unusually competent) and 
bribed with goods to stay with the umealik. In rare instances, an 
umealik might attempt to physically dominate other men, but this 
rarely happened since it was essentially counterproductive. If a 
umealik did attempt to dominate others, he would likely be killed 
or at least his crew members would move too far away from him 
to be dominated.30 
Qualities of the Eskimo Leader: Faced with these difficulties, how 
did Eskimo communities meet their needs for cooperative activity 
and avoidance of violence? In essence, men acted in concert with 
"no one being boss."3l If a man wished to initiate activities which 
demanded the assistance of his peers, he would raise the question 
indirectly, never forcing a yes or no answer and never placing 
someone in the difficult position of refusing. In so doing, he also 
30Pospisil argues from his own field work among the small Nunamiut 
band of Anaktuvuk Pass that the umealik, the hunting leader or whaling 
captain, resolved disputes between members of his faction or band though 
not as a bully. He argues that this leader in dispute resolution has been 
overlooked by ethnographers for other Eskimo groups, because the basis of his 
leadership is his economic skills and because his jurisdiction is limited to 
persons with whom he has specific familial and economic ties. This does not 
square, he concludes, with the predisposition of ethnographers to seek a 
single central authority that dispenses justice for the entire society. Gubser 
(1965) goes even further, calling the umealik (incongruously) a plaintiff. 
Though we accept Pospisil's frame of reference, our field work among 
the northern Eskimo does not support his conclusion concerning the umealik, 
and most assuredly does not support Gubser's conclusion of the umealik as 
interventionist, petitioner, or complainant. 
31 Umealiks in later years did often sit as members of the village council. 
However, Milan reports that when the president of one Eskimo village council 
called himself an umealik, other Eskimos scoffed at the analogy. The 
authority of umealiks and councilmen was differently defined. See Milan 
(1964), p. 42. 
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saved himself from a disappointing negative response. By a series
of subtle and indirect references he would communicate to certain
individuals that a proposed cooperative event was forthcoming. If
he did this subtly enough, no one would ever have to openly admit 
that he even knew what was being suggested. 
Moreover, the man proposing the cooperative event was never
forced to acknowledge that the planned undertaking was or was
not really his own idea. The man who was competent in the task 
to be undertaken and skilled in this type of communication often
became a leader because he could indicate what must be done so 
indirectly that no one need ever be offended. 
Thus, while dangerously low levels of social control 
accurately describe that aspect of traditional Eskimo life relating 
to "law" the necessary work of the social group was accomplished
through careful and deliberate subtlety. We believe these two 
facets of Eskimo life are partly responsible for the apparently 
contradictory impressions observers have had of Eskimos: on the
one hand, smiling and cooperative-on the other, violent,
aggressive, and demanding. Both impressions are true. 
ABORIGINAL ESKIMO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Because there were no legitimate interventionist authorities 
whom the victim could petition to treat violations of socially 
accepted norms, redress against violators of norms was
unpredictable. A victim of a conflict might flee or respond 
violently to an injury on his own behalf, or someone personally 
allied to him might so respond. The response would. be more a
product of his personal preparation for aggression (or lack of it) 
than any structural response of his group or subgroup on behalf of
legal norms. Thus, remaking of relationships and obligations that 
did occur took place because both disputants desired that it take
place. The emphasis was upon conciliation for reasons of
self-interest rather than resorting to extremes of flight or personal 
violence. No middle way was prepared by authority figures. The 
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task of leaders in these early days was only to point out necessary 
relationships for self-interest and then to step aside, but even this 
action was limited to hunting or subsistence activities. 
Conflict avoidance as a means and as an end had clear 
implications for the structure of Eskimo conflict resolution in the 
early days. To the extent that a party to a dispute or potential
dispute could depend on some predictable alliance and its response 
to aggression on his behalf, he could style his relationships to 
encompass risks that might indeed generate overt conflict. What 
intervention meant was that a compact between disputants could 
be forged in order to balance the relationship. The sanction and 
obligatio32 were dynamic elements of that compact. 
Although it seems apparent that the style of socially 
sophisticated leaders such as the umealik was that of conciliator, it 
cannot be said that a process of conciliation occurred as a 
procedural core of aboriginal Eskimo law ways. These early 
leader-managers stopped short of the act of intervention and 
interest definition (or conflict articulation) which were the 
necessary prerequisites to an induced process of conciliation upon
which disputants could depend. 
The evolution of the authority figure from near passive
manager of conflict to interventionist and overt conciliator can be
viewed as the major shift in Eskimo justice from the aboriginal
times to the council period (beginning in the early 1900's). 
Pospisil's model suggests that authority figures and their capacity
to act are the turning point upon which structural justice rather
than ad hoc adherence to group ethics resides, as these authorities
seek out and treat individual conflicts. This view is supported by
the evolution of Eskimo justice. Crucial to our analysis of the 
transition will be our description of the societal relationships that 
prompted this change. It is clear that these changes .were not in
guiding principles or in attitudes toward legal process. Conflict
avoidance in style as well as in goal remained the inherent 
attribute of Eskimo justice. Delineation of conflict remained 
32see page 15 for definition. 
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subdued: the emphasis in Eskimo jurisprudence remained on 
identification of mutual interests between offender and offended 
faction,  group, or community. Conciliation, in short, 
predominated and continues to mark the style of Eskimo justice. 
In sum, the Eskimos' precontact system of dispute solving 
stressed individual responsibility for obtaining redress and did not 
support formal coercive authority. This value system made it 
nearly impossible for a single leader to initiate social control. 
When a bully tried to impose his will, he generated antagonism and 
resistance; if he persisted, he would finally be put down. 
This structural pattern has changed two times within the last 
70 years; first, with the advent of missionaries and "white laws" in 
the person of the U.S. Commissioner, and, more recently, with the 
advent of the state trooper and local magistrate. The first of these 
changes had more beneficial results for law in the villages than the 
second. 
AMERICAN INTERVENTION AND ESKIMO LAW WAYS 
American power in the form of military forces (whose 
concern was primarily to demonstrate America's powers by 
showing the flag) had a significant effect on Eskimo dispute 
resolution. In addition, American missionaries (whose goal, quite 
distinct from civil and military authority, was religious conversion) 
also had a clear effect upon the evolution of Eskimo capacity to 
resolve intragroup conflict. 
The representatives of American law (soldiers, police 
authorities or judges) removed violent offenders to establish peace 
within Eskimo groups and to demonstrate their sovereignty over 
Eskimo people. Missionaries challenged the shaman's power to 
manipulate the w1iverse. They offered formulas for eliciting 
pleasant rather than unpleasant responses from the universe-if 
one acted in particular ways. 
From an Eskimo perspective, what occurred was the 
replacement of one set of powerful and relatively unchallengeable 
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figures with another. However, the difference lay in the 
predictable way their power could be manipulated to curb overt 
and known threats to group well-being. 
Agents of American power offered, as bullies and shamans 
did not, reinforcement for a mechanism that allowed Eskimos to 
treat conflicts from a base of predictable and dependable strength. 
This mechanism allowed a process of dependable case disposition 
to flourish-the village council. The village council, reinforced by 
outside Amtrican power, intervened in conflicts. However, it 
resolved them by employing the traditional process of indirection 
and by enforcing traditional norms. 
Missionaries and the Shaman 
Missionaries in their religious role aggressively challenged the 
only truly dangerous social position in northern Eskimo 
society-that held by the angatqoq (shaman). 
In traditional times, the angatqoq was considered a 
supernaturally powerful person and, as such, was viewed with 
ambivalence. While Eskimos believed he was capable of 
manipulating the supernatural environment to bring game or drive 
away evil spirits, they believed he was equally capable of inflicting 
damage. His actions seemed arbitrary and often their gifts would 
not always placate him. There was really no way around him 
except through another angatqoq, or if he became too dangerous, 
by killing him-a task fraught with both magical and physical 
danger. 
Missionaries not only appeared to control a generally superior 
technology, but being backed up by soldiers or police they had no 
fear of a shaman's magical or physical powers. Therefore, Eskimos 
assumed that missionaries also possessed great magical powers. 
Furthermore, missionaries were willing to ensure a peaceful 
afterlife-previously an uncertainty for Eskimos. And, at the 
simple price of obeying a small number of new taboos, 
missionaries provided them with the authority to abandon a whole 
host of other often troublesome taboos. Pragmatically, converting 
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was the best thing to do. And, in the face of such strong 
competition, large numbers of shamans simply quit practicing.33 
American Law and Murderers 
American authority, in the form of the Coast Guard cutter 
Bear and other vessels, as well as U.S. commissioners, provided a 
means to control the endemic murder, feuding, and the bully. 
Most importantly, this could be accomplished without any single 
Eskimo being responsible for it. Eskimos adapted very rapidly to 
this new phenomenon. Given the opportunity to use outside 
authority to enforce the Eskimo's preferred but often violated 
norm of  nonviolence, they abandoned murder almost 
completely. 34 Furthermore, the introduction of the village 
council system allowed Eskimos to institutionalize their own 
approach to social control. 
THE VILLAGE COUNCIL 
The particular origin of the village council as an 
organizational form of local government in northern Eskimo 
villages is not clear. It may have originated in and evolved from the 
Native church council of elders, or it may have been created by 
the federal Indian bureaucracy, the U.S. commissioners, the 
missionaries, or any combination of these. But whatever its origin, 
the village council came into being around the turn of this 
century, and modified by various Eskimo communities, it acted as 
a judicial entity in a uniquely Eskimo way. From 1900 to the 
early 1960's (the period which we consider to be a high plateau in 
the history of village Eskimo justice), the councils demonstrated a 
33van Stone (1958, 1962) notes these developments, which parallel our 
own informants' comments from other northern Alaska Eskimo communities. 
34until the last few years, the number of murders, so far as we can 
determine in northern Alaska, has been extremely low. This situation appears 
to be changing dramatically since 1970 (a trend which we feel directly 
reflects loss of the council system). 
30 
capacity for solving local disputes that has not existed before, or 
since, this period. 
The council was an organizational embodiment of an 
interventionist approach to conflict resolution. Its broad mandate 
was to take care of village problems. Within the impersonal 
organizational frame allowed by the council, an Eskimo could 
define and resolve conflicts by employing systematically 
traditional approaches to conflict resolution. Thus, the council 
added to Eskimo procedures of dispute resolution the 
authoritative element of intervention into other people's affairs 
that had been absent. Council members, however, were not 
required to individually play the role of aggressive interventionists 
in a conflict. Such a role would have been intolerable both to the 
council member and to those involved in the conflict. 
In traditional precontact communities, no one man or formal 
group had acted as arbiter of social control. By contrast, the 
village council could and did resolve disputes; it did so in 
consideration of the wrongdoer's character and with a view toward 
reintegrating him into the group. It could do this for two reasons. 
First, it acted with full backing of a seemingly omnipotent outside 
authority. Second, no single Eskimo had to take individual 
responsibility for this overt intervention. 
The council was a substitute in the village for the external 
law from which it derived its authority. Rather than sitting as a 
panel of judges and deciding cases on the basis of external law, it 
acted as a body from the village who expressed the community's 
interests in specific legal cases and a wide range of other matters. 
Because council members shared responsibility, the council 
system permitted the traditional Eskimo values of individual 
noninterference to be upheld and reinforced in the process of 
resolving specific disputes. This allowed a system of Eskimo law 
ways to be institutionalized for the first time, despite the 
Eskimos' continuing negative attitudes toward overt authority, 
which included an intense dislike of one man interfering with 
another. The council sat as an Eskimo group. This was the key to 
its success. 
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The council provided a forum in which those individuals 
naturally gifted at social manipulation could exercise their tale.nts 
and indeed could develop techniques of social control which were 
essentially Eskimo. It also freed the Eskimo community from the 
continual concern with murder-the major problem. 
Anyone who attempted to violently retaliate against the 
council for removing or chastising an offender would himself be 
quickly removed by outside authority. Clearly, violent retaliation 
against outside authority such as the police or military forces was 
impossible. The council was free to proceed because by the 
comparatively simple act of notifying an outside authority, it 
could cause a violent offender to be removed from the village, 
with no individual Eskimo taking responsibility or personally 
intervening. Then, with traditional Eskimo pragmatism, now based 
on the certainty of outside force, which was nonetheless not 
present in the community, Eskimos could seek methods of social 
control other than violence. 35 
The outside authority deferred to the council on nonviolent 
matters. This deference encouraged the council to broaden the 
range of its jurisdiction over nonviolent disputes in the village. In 
the process of broadening its authority, the council continued to 
apply essentially Eskimo techniques and sanctions, although 
sometimes these techniques and sanctions were similar to 
territorial and later state law. 
Council Procedures 
In essence, an Eskimo legal institution came into being for 
the first time during the council period and developed under the 
umbrella of outside authority. 
35The reader should not infer from our interpretation of the use of 
outside white power for developing internal Eskimo legal processes that this 
removal of power from Eskimo hands was an entirely positive political or 
social act. Our remarks are directed to the narrow subject of the potential for 
conflict resolution among Eskimos through time as it was influenced by that 
society's encounter with the agents of white society. 
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Individuals usually did not present their complaints in open 
session to initiate the proceedings. Instead, they privately 
communicated their grievances to individual council members. 
This reflected the old Eskimo pattern of nonconfrontation and 
indirection. Once it had received a complaint, the council also 
dealt with the issue in a circuitous fashion. It would state that 
"there has been talk about such and such a matter that involves A 
(the alleged wrongdoer) and the property of B (the probable 
complainant) and we should hear more about it." It would then 
proceed to call one at a time Complainant B, other witnesses or 
people who might have facts, and finally alleged Wrongdoer A. It 
did not encourage confrontation between A and B. However, all 
statements of Complainant B and other participants were read to 
the accused, Wrongdoer A (as well as other persons who might be 
left to testify). Questions to A and A's responses were also very 
circuitous as council members waited for either a confession from 
the accused offend.er or for others to relate information as it 
flowed from a more general discussion. 
The Eskimo View of Confession 
From aboriginal times, the Eskimo considered confession a 
good thing. 36 This was because the Eskimo's own good opinion of 
himself, as well as what he had learned to expect from his society, 
led him to believe he could confess almost anything without 
causing shock or receiving censure. These expectations for the 
most part arose from the fact that Eskimo society was essentially 
noncensorious. Therefore, confession had as much of an aspect of 
news-bringing as it did alleviation of guilt. 
Such social acceptance of a confessed wrong encouraged 
Eskimo honesty and made it easy for a wrongdoer to accept 
responsibility for an act. This in turn permitted re-establishment 
of social harmony. The council tended to operate in conformance 
36This does not include those confessions obtained by a shaman in spirit 
invocation trances. 
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with these traditional Eskimo ways of encouraging confession 
without censure. 
The Eskimo Marshall 
Perhaps the one truly new position established in Eskimo 
society during the council period was that of the Eskimo marshall. 
Eskimos had never had policemen. We cannot be sure how 
Eskimos actually viewed the marshall, but informants' accounts of 
his behavior and attitudes are instructive. 
Village marshalls were more limited in authority than U.S. 
policemen. Primarily, their duties were restricted to bringing 
individuals before the council and making limited fact-finding 
investigations. Review of these facts and preliminary conclusions 
of guilt or innocence was left to the council. 37 
The Council and its Source of Power 
Eskimos viewed the council's relationship to an outside 
power with mixed feelings. On one hand, they wanted the outside 
authority to reinforce the council's position of power within the 
community. On the other hand, they feared that this outside 
power source would w1dercut the council's influence and 
intervene directly into the internal disputes of the community. 
While the council borrowed power from outsiders and their 
agents, it did not borrow law from them. In one documented 
37 Statistics on case disposition compiled by graduates of the village 
constable training program suggest that at present (of councils, magistrates, 
and village policemen) village policemen informally dispose of an increasingly 
large number of village complaints. This means that the role of village 
policemen has now shifted to one that is similar to police in other places and, 
in absence of hearings by either council or magistrate is emerging as final 
judicial authority in the resolution of village misdemeanors. (See Dick North, 
"Bush Justice at Work," Kuslwquim Kronicle, p. 11.) 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
account of a district attorney's visit to an arctic village council, the
official asked the council members what questions they had about
law. The council, according to its own records, had heard matters 
which ranged under U.S. law from theft to child molestation and
divorce, but in the presence of the D.A. the council chose not only
to present far less potent matters, but it avoided naming even the 
most minor offenders. 
Excerpt 
March 29, 1946 
The D.A. addressed the council and told them that if there is
anything the council would like to know concerning order and
law in this village, now is the time to ask for advice and he said 
he'll be glad to help them. [The council] president said some 
people never cared to clean their houses in spring time and
furthermore they don't even pay the fine the council makes out
to them. "Who are they?" the D.A. asked. "If they are here we
will make them pay." Since they are not listed they were not
called.
While seemingly complying with the request that they ask
him his advice on legal matters, the council avoided those
questions which concerned it most. Moreover, in the relatively
minor problems that they did bring up, all Eskimos knew who the
offenders were; and in their way of seeing things, that was
punishment enough. They wanted the D.A. to state that the
council had the right to collect fines for such offenses. It
succeeded in its ploy without openly defining anyone as 
delinquent. In such a manner the council seems to have acted both 
as a device for public order and as a buttress against that power it 
relied upon for its authority. The problem of dealing with those
agents of unquestioned outside power paralleled the aboriginal 
Eskimo problem of how to exist with bullies and shamans who
could not be controlled.
Given the opportunity to maintain social order without 
necessity of murder, the council responded quickly, and carefully 
staked out a broad area of control which extended into nearly all
community affairs. For example, the council, as one council did, 
might maneuver school employees into a position of indebtedness
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that was favorable to the council. This type of maneuvering
allowed the council to use the power of school employees which 
could not be formally delegated to any person or group in the 
community. It would hear school questions that involved the 
community in such mundane matters as student conduct or 
parents' responsibilities to assure school attendance, provide ice, 
and assist in preparing meals. These hearings occurred regularly, 
often with no particular desired effect, but had the important 
function of keeping the council's hand in school affairs. When 
possible, the council threatened to expel a student from school in 
order to demonstrate its derived power from the school 
bureaucracy. Thus, the council used this threat as an overall 
sanction against youthful misconduct whether the misconduct 
related to school or not. As the agent of the school teacher or, in 
other cases, of the U.S. marshall, the coµncil derived power and 
influence which it could turn skillfully even against the sources of 
its power. 
When offenders were church members and the church in a 
particular village had its own council of elders, the council would 
refer matters of misconduct to the church, or allow the local 
preacher to lecture offenders at the end of its hearing. It never 
fully integrated the standards of conduct required by the church
into its own rules, but neither did it directly challenge them. 
Instead, in typical Eskimo fashion, the council avoided 
confrontation and threat to its own authority from this 
independent church authority by more or less incorporating the 
church into its own functions. It permitted the church council to 
act under village council auspices as a subsidiary legal forum in 
certain matters, generally in airing disputes which involved the 
shared beliefs and interests of the village church members. 38 
38 A school teacher who served as a lay preacher in one Eskimo village 
during the mid-1920's wrote that her sermon on laziness was vigorously 
translated (as she later learned) for the benefit of one member of the 
audience who owed the Native store several foxskins and another who owed 
his wife one foxskin for two bleached sealskins. The Eskimo interpreter spoke 
-"through" her sermon at the offenders, who acted immediately to make 
amends (Richards, 1949, p. 165). 
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Although the council relied on power derived from 
Anglo-Americans, its conception of justice and the means to 
obtain it differed from the Anglo-American legal processes. 
Nonetheless, given enough time, it usually succeeded in reducing 
wrongdoing, imposing public sanction against wrongdoers, and 
correcting conduct, ordinarily by public confession or agreement 
to mend one's way.39 
The following case illustrates the operation of a village 
council in its mature period. It comes from the unedited original 
records of a northern Alaska village: 
April 5, 1964 
The President of the Council asked P to tell the Village 
Council about the tin of Cavalier cigarettes that he have left 
behind and was gone. He went back for them but he only saw the 
place where he left it. He suspect that B had took it. The 
President told the Marshall to get A for further information to 
find out who really took the tin of Cavalier cigarettes. 
A is brought in. To ask him if he has any idea who took the 
cigarettes. A say that B was fishing alone where P left his 
cigarettes. He said that A and his wife were fishing closer to the 
village. A is dismissed and the next to be invited is B. P (a 
marshall as well as the complainant) is sent to get B. B is invited. 
The President ask him if he ever find anything that he could use. 
He ask him if he ever see P. He ask him if he knew where P had 
made a hole (in the ice) and also ask him if he ever see Cavalier 
cigarettes (italics added). 
B said that he never say anything. He also said that he won't 
tell a lie. B said that he goes fishing this year but never find 
cigarettes in holes. He said that he don't know or remember when 
he finds a cigarette. 
Some councilman had talk to him to tell the truth. That if he 
only tell truth he could do better. B said that he would tell the 
39The authors are presently preparing a casebook of problem cases 
heard in Eskimo village councils. Materials for the book are drawn from 
village council records, upon which this summary analysis is based. 
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truth if he had taken the Cavalier cigarettes. B said that he was 
asked if he ever saw anything. He said that he never saw anything. 
He said that he would return them to P if he finds them. 
B tried to go out but was put back to his place. He tried to 
fight his way out. But the Councilman tried to talk him out of it. 
The Councilman said to B if he never take or steal the Cavalier 
cigarettes that is all right, which of course B said that he never 
take the Cavalier cigarettes. 
B is dismissed on his case since he was telling the Councilman 
that he never saw or take the Cavalier cigarettes. The Village 
Councilman agreed to meet again (to) talk about this case again. 
The village council dismissed their meeting at 12:00 midnight 
with X (a councilman) to get more information about B's case. 
(The Next Meeting) 
April 15, 1954 
The purpose of this meeting is about B's case: X was invited 
for further information, whether B really took the tin of 
Cavalier. X says that he doesn't really know if B took the tin of 
Cavalier. So the Village Council talks this B's case over. President 
of the Village Council ask the council what they think about this 
case. The village council decided to have B for the last time. Ask 
him if he have been to R (the preacher) to straighten out this 
case. N is asked to get B. N come back without B. B said that he 
won't be invited for Council. The Council say that it won't be 
helped if he don't want to come so the Council leave it up to the 
session of the Presbyterian Church. 
Before the hearing, Complainant P told the president of his 
suspicion (that B took the cigarettes-an idea he had probably 
gotten from A). A, in his statement to the council, linked B to the 
scene of the theft. The victim did not directly complain to the 
wrongdoer, and thereby avoided direct confrontation. 
When the old Eskimo way of indirect questioning failed to 
elicit the expected confession, the council shifted its attention to 
the problem of B's attitudes and his refusal to tell the truth. It 
attempted to elicit contrition by stressing the Eskimo value of 
truthfulness, rather than expressing concern over the alleged theft. 
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B's reaction to flee was natural when the council applied
direct pressure on him. His dismissal was also necessary, since
without contrition and appeasement through confession on his 
part, the council could not act since it was interested more in 
eliciting guilty feelings than in proving guilt based on evidence 
which was absent in any event. It then referred the case to the
church in the hope that under pressure of the preacher, in the 
presence of his peers, B would reconsider his attitude toward the 
truth. To some extent, this maneuver also reflected the old 
Eskimo belief that supernatural (angatqoq) intervention could be
used to find the truth. 
Five months later, B was caught in the act of stealing 
cigarettes. The record notes: "B was telling that was the first time
he ever steal anything from them. But B was caught before on 
stealing from other people."
The wrongdoer was shamed, told to return the stolen goods, 
and restored to the community.
This example of council operation illustrates three important 
points: 
• Eskimo society had progressed from having no formal
law to formal law. In aboriginal times the victim of such
a theft would have no instrument of recourse except
himself. He might have either dismissed the act as
"borrowing" and avoided trouble, or if he were 
physically powerful enough, retaliated by borrowing a
similar item from the thief. By council times, however,
the thief could be confronted by a commonly 
recognized Eskimo authority . 
• Although a council intruded into an Eskimo's private
world, it did so gingerly and indirectly, in typical 
Eskimo fashion .
• The council resolved an issue simply by exposing the 
truth. This could not likely have been accomplished by 
outside authority. 
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Also quite significant was the council's goal of pressuring the
accused to acknowledge his guilt in order that he might feel 
contrition. This sought-after condition is best understood as the
necessary "state of grace" in the Eskimo process of resocializing 
wrongdoers. Eskimos viewed a wrongdoer's failure to give way and 
be contrite under the pressure of social disapproval as one of the
more serious aspects of the wrongful act. They knew that lack of
contrition could result in the kind of violent interpersonal 
conflicts that had characterized aboriginal Eskimo society. Thus, 
they saw contrition as the necessary forerunner of rehabilitation,
and as far more important than the effects of the crime itself.40
If the council succeeded in making the wrongdoer feel sorry
for what he had done, it would then tell him how he must behave
in the future to make up for his crime. The wrongdoer would then
be expected to impose these behavior limits on himself. 
If an offender was delinquent in paying a fine, the council 
would recall him. One such recall was generally sufficient. 
Sometimes before it suspended a sentence, the council would
impose conditions on an offender's future conduct. For example, 
individuals could be advised against associating with "bad types"
in the village. 
Although the employment of fines and suspended sentences
had a clear Western legal flavor, the rationale for their use was
related to Eskimo attitudes toward treatment of wrongdoers.
Sanctions were usually reintegrative. Fines paid to the community 
or to its members were literally reimbursements and not symbolic.
Sanctions were not employed for abstract rule-breaking or for 
abstract good. They flowed naturally from the persuasive council 
sessions that used rules as guides for harmonious social conduct.
The ancient but previously weak sanction of public opinion 
became truly powerful when organized and directed by the 
council. For example, the council often imposed such
40The council's jurisdiction was generally restricted to nonviolent crime.
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psychological sanctions as requiring a wrongdoer to make a public 
apology. Council members would lecture malefactors during 
prolonged meetings in which the public was invited to discuss an 
accused individual's entire behavior within his family or within the 
village. The extent to which facts concerning even one's sexual life 
or mental state could be bared was virtually limitless in this forum. 
When a young woman was involved, female council members 
would question her privately, and then report back to the council 
in order that the information might be recorded in council 
records. Such sanctions were expectably powerful. 
As the range of sanctions was broadened, so was the 
articulation of norms to govern group conduct formalized and 
given new focus by the council. 
Norms and Sanctions 
The rules of conduct formalized and employed by the village 
council were based on traditional standards of Eskimo behavior 
that extended far back into aboriginal times. As previously stated, 
however, employment of these norms had been either weak, 
uneven, or nonexistent. Then, when the village council came into 
being, there appeared for the first time the possibility of 
even-handed enforcement. 
This new-found ability to authoritatively wield power did 
not, as an Anglo-American might expect, lead council members to 
\I use their power in a heavy-handed or overbearing way; instead, 
they used their power in a careful, often indirect, manner that 
reflected the old Eskimo ways of minimal interference with 
others. 
The council formalized the old Eskimo notion that theft was 
taboo and required that violators remunerate their victims. Other 
types of antisocial actions against individuals could also result in 
wrongdoers being required to remunerate the victims (although 
sanctions could be stronger if the wrongdoer were an incorrigible 
repeater). One such example of formalized remuneration required 
of a wrongdoer would be child support payments to children born 
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Excerpt from a Council Record Book
June 18, 1955
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to a single woman or to a married woman by a man other than her
husband.
In many cases, these formalized rules did not directly reflect
U.S. territorial law, but instead were expressions of Eskimo 
attitudes toward their own intragroup behavior. Following is an
example from a northern Alaska council record: 
The purpose of this meeting is about the case of K having
sexual intercourse with two teenage girls, P and H. The village 
council decided to invite the two girls. P and H confess that they
have been having intercourse many times with old man K. P say
that K always give P cigarettes, stockings, and candy. P and H
dismissed. 
The village council decided to invite K. K invited before the 
council and was asked by the President to talk to the village
council. K say that he don't remember how many times he have
intercourse with these girls; he says that he have intercourse most
with H. K say that he tells the truth of his past experiences on 
this morality. K dismissed, with prayers offered as requested by 
K.41 
The inquiry into this sexual activity was only partly an 
interest in malefaction. Essentially, the council wanted to know if
there was anything about the situation they should take seriously. 
Obviously there was not. Nothing dangerous had taken place. 
Behavior that was likely to catalyze a violent confrontation was
much more serious to the council than behavior that simply 
violated religious, territorial, or state law. On the other hand, 
sending of messages between young girls and married men was 
seen as serious, not because of its sexual connotation, but because 
41Milan (1964) reports that K was later sentenced to 6 months in the 
Nome jail for breaking of a U.S. law dealing with contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor. Council records and correspondence do not indicate
that the council notified outside authorities. It appears that either the parents
of the girls or a white teacher or missionary notified the marshal!. 
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  of its potential for jealous violence including suicide and murder.Eskimos also considered gambling to be serious since it posed a potential challenge to extant property relationships, which couldresult in a violent response by the loser.When, for example, a married woman had a child by anothermarried man, (as occurred in one northern Eskimo community),the council saw the problem as primarily economic. By suggestingthe suspected father provide support to the woman's family for hischild, the council avoided alluding to legal presumptions ofpaternity or applying criminal sanctions for adultery.In another area, the council saw "crazy behavior," such asthat caused by drinking, to be a more serious matter than casuallovemaking between young people. Such a view came fromcenturies of Eskimo experience accumulated from living togetherin small groups in a unique environment. Such experience had ledthe Eskimos to develop the subtle skills required to maintainharmonious interpersonal relationships.Clearly, the ancient pragmatic basis of Eskimo law reasserteditself in the council's operations. Though council deliberationsoften lacked specific procedures for due process and enunciationof individual rights, the intended results of these Anglo-Americanprocedural safeguards, such as balanced justice and acceptablesocial order and harmony, seem to have been attained remarkablyoften. Summary of Village Council System A comparison of the Eskimo council system with thecoexisting Western legal system that served other Alaskans(through U.S. marshalls, commissioners, and later, state lawofficers), shows both similarities and differences. The Eskimo legalsystem, as opposed to the Western system, was designed to avoidconflict rather than to define it, though both systems strove toresolve conflict. Legal norms in both systems were designed todefine means of avoiding conflict. However, the lenient treatment43
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by the village council of acts that would have been severely 
prosecuted in territorial or state courts reflected a different point 
of emphasis in Eskimo justice from that which existed in Western 
justice. Retribution was not at the forefront of Eskimo law ways. 
The council's initiative in investigation of a case was perceived as
the preliminary and often only necessary corrective action when 
the goal was reintegration of offenders. Western justice in its 
approach highlighted the conflict between adversaries and the 
offender's conflict with accepted societal norms. Yet in the
Eskimo system of justice, case disposition was directed by no 
greater abstraction than getting along with other villagers. 
Wrongdoers who could not accept the council's conciliatory 
approach were sent away to be dealt with by the Western legal
system. 42 
A case before the territorial judge might be Alaska vs. Jones.
A case before the council would be better described as Jones and 
his fellow villagers, talking. 
THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD: THE MAGISTRATE SYSTEM 
Gradually, over the last ten years, the State of Alaska has
introduced the local Eskimo magistrate and the Eskimo village
constable into northern Eskimo villages as a permanent fixture of 
the unified state legal system. By the middle of the 1960's, for all
practical purposes, the magistrate system had largely supplanted 
the village council system among the northern Eskimos as a forum 
for dispute resolution. This represented a significant break with 
the structured legal system that had evolved since the early 1900's
in the form of the village council and its forum.
The State Magistrate 
Magistrates are lay judges of limited jurisdiction, appointed 
by the presiding judge of the superior court in each judicial
421n villages where there are no magistrates and where councils still act 
as judicial bodies, this remains an underlying theme of bush justice. 
district. Each has the power to judge cases arising from violation 
of village ordinances passed by the village council. He can also 
sentenc defendants who plead guilty to state misdemeanors or 
hear state misdemeanor cases when the defendant consents. 
Finally, he has the jurisdiction to hold a preliminary hearing to see 
if an arrested person should be bound over to superior court on a 
felony charge and to see if the state can show probable cause from 
admissible evidence. 
His civil jurisdiction is limited to smaller claims of $1,000 in 
damages or in property loss. The magistrate also performs such 
various administrative duties as coroner, record keeper of vital 
statistics, notary public, performer of marriage, and custodian of 
the property of deceased persons. 
Eskimo View of the Magistrate­
The Single Authority Figure 
When he puts on the robe of a state magistrate, a single 
member of the village takes up the symbols of outside law to sit in 
independent judgment of his peers. The corporate shell of the 
council that gave council members a screen behind which to 
proceed with calculated indirection has been removed, thereby 
exposing the direct actions of a single individual. To the Eskimo, 
interference from such an individual is intolerable if it occurs 
independently of a corporate structure. He can only tolerate 
interference when it is seemingly nondirected, as it was in the 
context of the council forum. 
This feeling against a single authority sometimes causes 
hostility to be directed specifically at the magistrate. In one 
crowded courtroom in northern Alaska, for example, a man spoke 
from the rear of the court in Eskimo to the judge, causing the 
magistrate to dismiss the case immediately. When the state trooper 
who was present asked in English what had occurred, the 
magistrate said that the speaker was the defendant's brother and 
had threatened the magistrate if he proceeded with the case. No 
such threat would likely have been made to or acknowledged by 
the council. 
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Though such a reaction to the magistrate is rare, its 
implications are important. The magistrate stands out as a single, 
one-man authority whose actions can directly interfere with an 
individual's private world. In carrying out his official actions, the 
magistrate stands alone. He cannot diffuse his singular authority 
among the members of a council. Thus, because it presents a single 
human target for affected wrongdoers to retaliate against, the 
magistrate system creates continual potential for conflict. 
The Eskimos deal with this potential for conflict by avoiding 
the formalities required by the magistrate system, which in turn 
renders the system less effective. Even the magistrates often 
attempt to avoid their formal roles, although with little success. 
The Eskimo Magistrate's Interpretation 
of his Role 
Eskimo magistrates have partially reinterpreted the role of 
magistrate. The effect of this reinterpretation has not been to 
enhance the magistrate's court as a forum for dispute resolution. It 
is neither an able court nor an able substitute for a council. 
Eskimo magistrates and Eskimo defendants rarely distinguish 
between evidentiary guilt and guilty feelings. In fact, Eskimo 
defendants generally do not request counsel because of this 
tendency. The failure to make this distinction is not caused by a 
lack of training on the part of the magistrate nor of incapacity for 
analytic thinking on the part of either the magistrate or defendant. 
In pre-magistrate times, an Eskimo's tendency to confess had the 
practical purpose of mending disrupted social relations and 
worked as a positive social tool. 
As the statistics on guilty pleas and rates of conviction from 
one northern Eskimo magistrate court indicate (see Table 1 ), the 
aggregate effect is tqat an arrested Eskimo is a convicted Eskimo. 
The Eskimo magistrate tends to accept these guilty pleas as 
knowledgeable and voluntary because he sees no difference 
between guilty feelings and technical legal guilt. Furthermore, 
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF CASE DISPOSITION BEFORE AN ESKIMO MAGISTRATE COURT, 1964-70
Year 
Guilty Pleas 
DIP* Other 
 Conviction
Rate** 
Proport ion of Total Convictions Suspended 
All Other than  Other than DIP &
 Offenses DIP DIP transporting liquor 
(Percentage) 
1970 100.0 93.9 98.0 32.3 35.8  30.3 31.6 
 1969 99.0 92.3  95.4 60.0 60.0  59.2 63.l
 1968 100.0 96.7  95.9 57.5 63.0 57.5  55.9
1967 98.2 91.4 94.2 41.9 40.0 43.2 45.8 
 1966 97.8 85.8 96.9  60.7 68.1 51.4 46.3 
1965  99.0  93.0 100.0  29.0 27.2 31.3 40.3 
1964  95.0 96.3 100.0 12.7 12.5 11.1 12.2 
Number 
DIP and 
 Percent  Transporting Percent 
Number of total  Liquor of total 
Recorded Offenses 
1964-70 1,375  717*
Not Guilty Pleas 54 3.9 7 .97 
Court Dismissals 25 1.7 0 
Judged Not Guilty  15 1.0 0 
*Of these 717 offenses, 627 were DIP.
.i,,. 
-J 
*Drunk in Public
**Conviction rates recorded in this Eskimo court reflect 
dismissals in preliminary hearings on serious state offenses 
where special effort was made by the magistrate to induce 
acceptance by the defendant of an attorney. Statistics on 
gu ii ty pleas also include hearings of bootleggers who 
employed counsel and pleaded not guilty. Generally, pleas 
entered did not reflect the influence of plea bargaining 
be tween counsels for defendant and the state as would 
comparable statistics in an urban court. 
because the defendant generally does not request a defense counsel, 
there is no one to advise him on the consequences of a guilty plea 
or to distinguish for him between guilty feelings and evidentiary 
guilt. Additionally, there is no one to present this argument to the 
court. To the magistrate, therefore, a guilty plea entered in open 
court nearly always means that he must convict the defendant as 
charged with no need to view the evidence that supports the 
charge. The extremely low rate of case dismissals and not-guilty 
pleas ( see Table 1) reflects this unfortunate tendency. 
Faced with high rates of guilty pleas and resulting high rates 
of conviction, the magistrate feels he generally has only two 
remedies. After finding the defendant guilty, he can implement 
the maximum statutory sentence or he can suspend sentence. 
Generally unaware of the flexibility permitted him at this stage of 
the proceedings, he does not know that he is empowered to reduce 
charges or to measure sentences according to their suitable 
rehabilitative and deterrent effect in the individual case. Where the 
council procedures of the past strove to rehabilitate the offender 
and reintegrate him into the community, the magistrate, even in 
applying a suspension of sentence, merely warns the offender that 
the police "will be keeping their eyes on you" and implies that 
future offenses will be dealt with more harshly. 
Even where the magistrate would like to suspend a sentence 
in order to soften the effect of ( what he sees as) the nearly 
automatic process of conviction and punishment, he is faced with 
competing pressures not to suspend. The Eskimo magistrate 
recognizes that the community feels "something should be done" 
about the lawbreakers. He feels, however reluctantly, that his job 
given him by the court requires him to "do something." Further, 
he feels somewhat to blame for the once-effective village council 
falling into disuse. Finally, because of his ignorance of judicial 
flexibility, subtle and not so subtle pressures from state troopers 
pushing for maximum sentences have usually resulted in lower 
levels of suspended sentences than occur in urban courts (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1 shows wide year-to-year variations in the rate of 
suspended sentences for a single community. This resulted in part, 
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we feel, because a state trooper stationed in this community had 
suggested to the magistrate and to the village policemen that not 
only were suspended sentences an inappropriate response to 
convictions, but that more offenders should be charged with and 
tried under state statutes instead of local ordinances. Since in most 
cases state laws carry heavier maximum sentences, this procedure 
resulted in many more serious sentences for minor offenders in the 
community. The magistrate was deeply concerned by this, not 
feeling it was quite just. Yet he felt powerless in the face of this 
pressure. Being somewhat ignorant of the corrective options 
available to him, he simply resigned his position. 
This suggests even more strongly that the magistrates 
generally feel that they cannot act as buffers between the 
perceived arbitrariness of outside law and their own community 
needs. Many magistrates are also unwilling to act merely as an arm 
of the police force. Yet, they perceive the legal structure in which 
they are embedded as unmanipulatable. This view by frustrating 
their tendencies to avoid conflict and amelioratively handle social 
disorder, prevents them from using the traditional creativity that 
the council system so effectively used in dealing with such social 
problems. As a result, the magistrate, burdened with an authority 
that made him alien to Eskimo ways, feels powerless to discharge 
his authority in a way that is acceptable to his people. 
Many magistrates in order to work with a system which they 
feel is not responsive to manipulation attempt to operate outside 
the formal structure to solve disputes. For example, some 
magistrates encourage the village policeman to treat the offender's 
case informally instead of filing a criminal complaint. He may be 
told to settle it on the spot or to arrest an individual informally 
and take him to the council as a preliminary step. The village 
policeman, faced with a burden as intolerable as the magistrate's, 
is likely to comply. He knows that when the magistrate treats the 
problem formally, arrests almost invariably result in conviction. 
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Plea Bargaining vs. Eskimo Informal Procedure 
Informal attempts by Eskimo magistrates to avoid hearing 
cases might appear to be interpreted as a parallel development to 
the process of plea bargaining by legal practitioners in urban 
courts. There are, however, fundamental underlying differences. 
Plea bargaining, it is true, is also informal. However, it 
comprises a series of specific considerations directly related to the 
specific alternatives offered by the formal judicial process. Plea 
bargaining (Casper, 1972; 92ff) takes place with pragmatic 
references to the statutory elements of the offense, as well as the 
likelihood of successful prosecution. 
The prosecutor considers both the fruits of the police 
investigation and the likelihood that the evidence will be rebutted 
for factual deficiencies or for procedural irregularities incuned in 
acquiring it. The prosecutor also takes into account the 
importance of selectively prosecuting the given case or others in 
this offense category or the arrested individual by means of a 
public trial for a conviction upon the evidence presented. 
Conversely, the defense attorney decides to bargain or to go to 
trial according to his own analysis of the statute and relevant 
case law. He also evaluates his potential for success in excluding or 
rebutting evidence on motions or in trial. 
Both the prosecutor and defense attorney decide whether to 
bargain or proceed to trial in light of their pending case loads. 
Furthermore, both consider the relative skill and commitment of 
their opponents to win at trial. 
In short, these compromises or plea bargains are an integral 
and accepted part of the accusatorial system which demands of 
the practitioners a particularized evaluation and comprehension of 
the criminal justice procedure and the roles legal professionals play 
in the procedure. Thus, when an urban defendant "cops a plea," 
he considers the relative pw1ishments that may be inflicted upon 
him if he stands trial with representation by counsel or if he pleads 
guilty to the offense as charged or to a lesser offense. 
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In contrast to this, the informal response of Eskimo 
participants stems from an aggregate avoidance of the system 
itself-of the laws, rules of evidence, and the litigious or 
combatant posture which in their entirety may be unintelligible or 
even distasteful to Eskimos. The Anglo-American approach has 
historically failed to resolve conflicts or to appropriately apply 
corrective sanctions in Eskimo society because it is this legal 
approach which is unacceptable to many Eskimo participants. 
The prosecutor's or judge's calculation that a particular 
conviction is likely or useful according to the broad mandate of 
his job does not play a part in the Eskimo magistrate's decision to 
proceed informally or to refer a case to the village council. To the 
contrary, these informal decisions, which include a redefinition of 
magisterial procedure by the magistrate, are often characterized by 
legal professionals and by the magistrates themselves as an open 
secret, unacceptable if formally acknowledged. It is felt that such 
informal processes that do exist in the rural justice system must 
depend on the "wink" of the friendly district judge or magistrate 
supervisor. They are perceived by all participants as unsupported 
by calculations made in light of the formal choices of the justice 
system. 
If the magistrate's informal attempt to ameliorate the effects 
of the justice system on village offenders, victims, or communities 
is challenged by a single legal professional privy to the 
arrangement, such as a technically trained and aggressive state 
trooper or village policeman, or the legal practitioner who may 
happen to be in the village, the magistrate capitulates. 
Nonetheless, many magistrates continue to hold the justice system 
at bay and reduce what they see as its adverse requirements. To do 
so, magistrates communicate with friendly professionals or with 
other magistrates highly esteemed by professionals in order to 
receive verbal support or help to remove this overly technical 
individual from their domain. In such an attempt, a magistrate 
looks for personal support of his position rather than for technical 
support of legal theory. In large part, this is because he does not 
realize that there is support within the extant legal system for his 
autonomous action as judge. 
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The net result of informal legal activity in rural villages that 
proceeds in lieu of formal procedure rather than as an attribute of 
formal procedure is that procedural rights of the defendant as well 
as rights to review lower court proceedings by higher courts are 
lost. Informal activity is not in fact an option to asserting one's 
rights and proceeding to trial. 
The interplay between plea bargaining and litigation in urban 
justice does not have its counterpart in the interplay between 
informal avoidance and the adversarial system in the bush because 
the avoidance in the latter case is not a reasonable alternative to 
the detail and role of the legal system in the village community. 
The Magistrate Court and the Village Council 
Compared to the council, the magistrate forum is inadequate 
for northern Eskimos. Eskimos see the role of magistrate as a 
limited one and this view limits both the kinds of norms and the 
range of available sanctions that the magistrate may apply. The 
graph (see Figure 1) shows that the need to avoid disputes has 
increased and the strength of available redress has decreased, 
thereby illustrating the retrogressive effect of the magistrate's 
capacity to promulgate norms to guide community behavior. 
The magistrate's court, as an Anglo-American institution, 
does not desire the defendant to convict himself through his 
testimony. The council, on the other hand, promoted the Eskimo 
virtue of confession. In fact, it considered the silent offender to be 
antisocial, deserving formal arrest and incarceration. Finally, the 
adversary system of the court demands a direct formal 
confrontation between antagonists that the procedure of the 
council was expressly designed to avoid. 
Because cases heard by the U.S. Commissioner and then the 
magistrate are almost exclusively criminal in nature, individuals 
do not consider the magistrate court an appropriate forum for 
weighing private or civil matters and will not bring them to the 
magistrate. As noted, no such distinction was made in cases that 
the council heard. 
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Figure 1 
Increases and Decreases in Need for Dispute Avoidance and
Strength of Available Social Redress, 1900 to Present
01 
u, 
The shape of law in Eskimo villages has changed because the 
introduction of a formal court in the bush is a direct intervention 
of the Alaska legal process into village life. It has replaced the 
deference of white authorities to the council in the realm of law. 
While the council could develop law and proceed as it saw fit 
under a cloak of authority, the formal delegation of legal power to 
the magistrate is more restricted. His job is defined. His authority 
to apply law in judgment of other villagers cannot be delegated or 
concealed. Power had been delegated to the council informally 
without necessitating legal definitions and directives. Under the 
court system, however, power is couched in formal definitions and 
procedures that cannot be easily modified even when they do not 
fit with Eskimo needs or expectations, nor can they be made to 
fit. 
A Summary of the Magistrate System 
In summary, introduction of a formal Anglo-American court 
in the bush has changed the shape of law in Eskimo villages. It has 
replaced the once-effective village council, run by Eskimos and 
based on traditional Eskimo ways, with the magistrate's court, 
which attempts to solve disputes by applying Alaska state law. The 
change has been a step backward in bush justice, because the 
magistrate system simply does not have the flexibility, the 
authority, nor enough Eskimo trust to be effective in dealing with 
the Eskimos and their traditional ways. As a result, it has increased 
the Eskimo's need to avoid disputes while decreasing his means of 
redress. 
The price of introducing the magistrate system in place of the 
council system has been a high one. It ended a particular historical 
opportunity to allow northern Eskimo communities to develop 
their own forums for formalizing Eskimo laws and sanctions to fit 
unique Eskimo needs. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSH JUSTICE 
One could credibly argue that the Eskimo magistrates fail to 
make use of the full range of sanctions allowed by law and avoid 
hearing cases because they lack sufficient legal knowledge to 
function adequately as judges. However, as previously noted, the 
Eskimo judge faces a special problem in an Eskimo society. We 
believe this special problem could be alleviated by dividing the 
authority among several individuals in a council-type body. We 
feel this could be effective and still meet the standards of due 
process, with slight changes to the original council's method of 
operation. 43 
The "right to be heard" in a trial that weighs law and 
evidence presented by adversaries or their representatives is the 
keystone of the Anglo-American legal system. However, when this 
justice system is applied in an Eskimo village, each participant or 
potential participant (victim, constable, offender, and magistrate) 
guided by traditional Eskimo ways, has a natural tendency to 
avoid the adversarial relationships that are the essence of the 
accusatory system. 
Eskimo complainants avoid reporting crimes because they 
find the nature of the adversary system abhorrent and do not want 
to be in it. In most cases, they find the role required of them in 
such a proceeding to be less attractive than the consequences of 
offenses committed against them. Defendants abdicate their roles 
as hedgehogs in the accusatorial system; they waive their right to 
plead not guilty, their right to remain silent, their right to retain 
counsel to present evidence or question evidence presented by 
the state. Eskimo magistrates fail to examine police conduct and 
village constables do not learn how to present evidence or make 
cases at trial. Finally, magistrates do not learn how to interpret 
law or to apply it to evidence presented by the state or the 
defendants. 
43vmage council procedures according to the requirements of due 
process are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Legal education alone is not the answer to the problems of 
Eskimo justice raised in this paper. Any approach to these 
pro bl ems that fails to consider the Eskimo's basic attitudes toward 
Anglo-American law is doomed to failure. 
Northern Eskimo attitudes toward the accusatorial system of 
dispute resolution also differ from those of Athabascans (which 
we have noted elsewhere). Athabascan attitudes are shaped by 
learned or historical relationships to village authority and the 
power of the chief. These relationships have more parallels to 
court authority than do Eskimo notions. The Eskimo's conflict 
with the adversarial proceedings of Anglo-American jurisprudence 
is rooted deeply within the Eskimo personality; its basis lies in his 
learned responses to other individuals and to his own world. 
The Question of Guilt 
One can question on constitutional grounds whether a 
northern Eskimo can knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
be heard by admitting guilt without benefit of counsel and 
without the state first introducing proof of its allegations. 44 This 
44The right to a fair hearing that is not a "mockery and a farce" but a 
"genuine trial" has been the impelling rationale of decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and Alaska State Supreme Court that affirmed the right to 
"effective representation" by counsel, absent knowing and intelligent waivers 
of defendant's rights. See Powell vs. Alabama 287 US 45, 77 L.Ed. 158 
(1932); Escobedo vs. Illinois 387 US 478, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977 (1963); Ingram vs. 
State 450 P.2d 161 (Alaska 1969); and Anderson vs. State 438 P.2d 228 
(Alaska 1968). 
The Alaska court noted that a genuine trial is "where the government is 
put to its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance 
with established principles of law and fundamental notions of fair play and 
substantive justice." Dimmick us. State 473 P. 2d 616,618 (Alaska 1970). 
The Supreme Court has looked favorably at alternative legal roles where 
confronted with prisoners who were physically as well as intellectually 
removed from access to the prerequisites of a fair hearing. Johnson vs. Avery 
393 US 483, L.Ed. 2d 718 (1969). Clearly the absence of trials in Alaskan 
villages represents a removal from the legal process that is as grave as that 
faced by members of any prison community. 
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question suggests that the Alaska justice system has a duty to 
impel a showing of proof by the state or municipality. To do so, it 
could refuse waivers entered for a defendant not represented by 
counsel or it could modify the present judicial structure to 
compensate for the Eskimo magistrate's disinclination to try cases 
by confrontation of offenders, victims, or officers of the court. If 
northern Eskimos are to feel that they can receive justice from the 
legal process, that process must include a rational means to weigh 
community norms of social control against rights guaranteed to all 
individual citizens. 
It is neither possible nor beneficial to return to precouncil 
days nor to a legal system that is not incorporated into the state 
justice system. Among other dramatic changes, the monetary 
impact of the Native claims settlement and, for some villages, the 
influx of outsiders to work on the Alaska pipeline will demand 
both a professional grasp of state law and capable law enforcement 
if the village is to survive as a social entity. 
What emerges, then, is the need to provide adequate judicial 
services, law enforcement, and correctional services through Native 
or non-Native personnel. The system offering services must have 
maximum autonomy within the guidelines of due process. Several 
other countries have redefined law enforcement, judicial, and 
correctional agencies to meet special cultural needs without, at the 
same time, creating ineffectual Mandarin forms. 45 It is possible 
for the Alaska justice system to make equally adequate 
adaptations. 
45 After a comparative study of Greenlander customs, the Danes added 
lay assessors to the courts and broadened the range of corrections available in 
the Danish code when it was applied in Greenland. (See Goldschmidt, 1956). 
Lay conciliation boards in Ceylon's villages have been instituted within the 
formal legal system to resolve many disputes that would burden higher 
courts. (Gooneskere and Metzger, 1971 ). 
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CONCLUSION 
We conclude that embedded in the culture and personality of 
the northern Eskimo was a value system that led him to avoid 
conflicts by behaving nonaggressively. This set of values and their 
associated attitudes determined the existence or nonexistence of 
roles, behavioral norms, and sanctions used to resolve conflicts. 
Eskimo law ways were signals that communicated to the socially 
attuned Eskimo how he should modify his own behavior so that 
he could interact with the group without precipitating violent 
confrontation. In this light, where adversariality is built into the 
legal process, it is hard to reconcile this process with Eskimo 
expectations in behavior. 
The present Alaska legal system fails to offer the Eskimo a 
means to weigh the merits of conflicting claims. The Eskimo tries 
to avoid the adversary procedure just as he attempts to avoid 
conflict. His attempts at conflict avoidance range from total 
inaction to individual or group violence toward an offender. 
During the council period, a dispute-solving body was set up 
to avoid or conceal the imbalance in power between judge and 
judged. The council operated informally under power derived 
from the legal system but with the autonomy necessary to adapt 
its procedure to Eskimo behavior. The council's success in 
articulating and enforcing the law was defined by the Eskimo 
socialization that preceded it and not by Western legal norms and 
procedures. The council adapted Anglo-American law to Eskimo 
social life. The magistrate system has not. 
Preliminary Suggestions for Reform 
How can the state justice system provide a forum for 
conciliation among disputants? 
Plea bargaining is in effect an extension of the adversary 
process that is conciliatory or compromise seeking. It relates to 
the detail of what may occur if the case proceeds to trial. In the 
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magistrate system, informal activity is not in response to this 
detail of, e.g., what evidence may or may not be produced, the 
jury's response, the likely sentence, but against participation in the 
uncontrollable legal system, to intervention by the magistrate per 
se. 
Because the prosecutor and defense attorney are generally 
absent or not requested in village courts and, more importantly, 
because their roles and adversarial postures are already too far 
along the road to conflict production, we suggest that the legal 
system must provide a less adversarial realm of preliminary 
compromise, preliminary to the trial or procedures which weigh 
the issues of trial, innocence or guilt, and punishment. 
We suggest that bush justice reforms will be accomplished 
best through broadening legal procedures to allow for an optional 
but formal integration of procedures best performed by the village 
cGuncil. Specifically, after arrests, a council-like body could 
determine which complaints might be best resolved informally and 
which should be sent to the magistrate for hearing. 46 If such a 
body decided that village justice would best be served by a 
conviction in magistrate's court, the odium presently associated 
with roles of the village police and village magistrate would be 
relieved. Furthermore, this would allow the present informal 
avenue for avoidance of the legal system to be incorporated as an 
optional and reviewable mechanism of the formal legal system. 
As a second and independent matter, we suggest that village 
councils or council-like bodies be given an advisory role in 
sentencing and correctional matters. In a presentence hearing 
46This suggestion is for nothing more than a procedural device to give 
force to Alaska statutes that provide for compromise of misdemeanors by the 
injured party. See AS 12.45.120 and AS 12.45.130. 
An alternative would be to encourage arbitration of disputes on the civil 
side of the court before a panel of villages rather than employment of the 
criminal justice process by the would-be complainant or victim. 
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(requested by the defendant), the council might introduce salient
social facts that would supplement the magistrate's knowledge of
the offender. This would allow the magistrate to sentence with an
eye toward reintegrating the offender into the community as well
as detening similar offenses.
These suggestions are necessarily preliminary. Their basis in
the reality of bush justice has been stated above. Their basis in
case law and statute wiil be included in another study of this series 
along with other suggested reforms. 
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